‘Lemmygrad’s resident expert on fascism’ — GrainEater, 2024

The political desperadoes and ignoramuses, who say they would “Rather be Dead than Red”, should be told that no one will stop them from committing suicide, but they have no right to provoke a third world war.’ — Morris Kominsky, 1970

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Cake day: August 27th, 2019

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  • One can see some similarity between the badchen and the court jester, a rôle which was common in the courts of the kings of Europe; however, they were essentially different from one another. The court jester was distinguished from the surrounding society by his dress and sometimes by his mental and physical limitations. The badchen, on the other hand, was dressed and looked like the members of the community, as well as well versed in Jewish customs and Talmudic tracts.

    By the sixteenth century, the Jewish badchens had become extremely popular amongst the Jewish communities. His entertainment rôle was characterized by sharp wit. By the eighteenth century, the status of the badchen had greatly improved, economically as well as socially, and he had become a new type of social leader whose company was much desired. There were three renowned badchens who became the focus of many tales: Hershel of Ostropol (1757–1811), Motke Chabad (1820–1880), and Eliakum Zunser (1836–1913).

    […]

    Many of the jokes attributed to Hershel are witticisms derived from Yiddish. Contrary to expectations, this jester was a very distinguished figure in his community. The jokes he told dealt with his own life story, as well as the familiar Jewish stereotypes,⁹⁷ making him the most popular Jewish jester both in oral stories and in the popular Jewish literature of Eastern Europe.⁹⁸

    (Source.)










  • Anarcho-Bolshevik@lemmygrad.mltoAsklemmy@lemmy.mlAre you a 'tankie'
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    11 days ago

    The reason that MovingThrowaway said ‘Almost none of us were alive when Khrushchev rolled tanks into Hungary’ is that certain British socialists coined the pejorative ‘tanky’ to nickname communists who approved of the Warsaw Pact intervention in the Hungarian People’s Republic (and later, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), but hardly anybody uses the pejorative this way anymore.

    In practice, application now varies widely, from approving of the Bolsheviki to opposing the Ukrainian government to suggesting that maybe North Korean politicians think and behave like ordinary human beings. The contemporary criteria are so variable that many would argue that the term is too vague to be useful.



  • [T]he war to the West remained ‘a political struggle’ (MacKenzie, 1995: 97), while to the East it was all‐out war. From the beginning, Hitler had regarded the war to the East not as ‘a formal battle between two states, to be waged in accordance with the rules of International Law, but as a conflict between two philosophies’ (Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel’s Nuremberg testimony, quoted in MacKenzie, 1994: 505). Accordingly, [Fascist] propaganda described the conflict with the Soviet Union as one between two mutually exclusive worldviews, the Soviet one being branded ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ (Schulte, 1988: 228).

    For Hitler (quoted in Streim, 1982: 27), this meant specifically that the army had to distance itself from the traditional point of view that still held fast in the West, according to which enemy soldiers were comrades‐in‐arms united by a shared set of values and a sense of professional solidarity: ‘The communist is before [the war] not a comrade‐in‐arms and after [the war] not a comrade‐in‐arms’. With nothing uniting the actors in this conflict, there was also nothing that called for restraint, as it was not the aim of the war in the East ‘to conserve the enemy’ (Hitler, quoted in Hartmann, 2009: 309, footnote omitted).

    Schulte (1988: 150) in this respect writes that ‘documents from the highest level impressed on the [Axis] troops [on the Eastern front] that they were engaged in an ideologically based racial war of extermination […] that was by its very nature qualitatively different from the conventional war […] conducted in the West’. According to Hitler, the point in this war was not to win against the enemy, but to eradicate him once and for all (Streim, 1982: 27).

    [The Third Reich] thus approached its relation to its Eastern and Western enemies in two fundamentally different ways: To the East, local populations as separate entities were to disappear through eradication or assimilation, with [the Third Reich] expanding into their territory, while to the West, relations between the enemies as separate entities were expected to outlast the war, hatred being understood merely as a symptom of current hostilities that should not replace mutual respect as the fundamental characteristic of relations.18

    (Emphasis added. Source.)


  • As in the First World War, the United Kingdom (UK) would have to turn to the United States of America (USA) for supplies on the scale necessary for a large army. […] Overseas finance in the Second World War came to depend on the willingness and ability of the U.S. government to persuade Congress that it was in America’s interests that the British war effort should be sustained. […] However, with first lend–lease and then the USA’s entry into the war the British Army became increasingly reliant on American‐supplied equipment: for example, from 1942 more than half of the British Army’s new tanks came from the USA.43

    (Source.)

    Of course, Wall Street was ground zero for the Great Depression, which arguably makes Imperial America’s important contributions to the European Allies less impressive: solving a problem that you started is the responsible thing to do, but it should be baseline and rarely laudatory.

    While we can still give some credit to the Western Allies for defeating the Axis, few historians disagree that the Soviets contributed the most to vanquishing the Third Reich. Even Winston Churchill, as much as I loathe him, conceded that the Soviets ‘t[ore] the guts out of the’ Wehrmacht.

    Now this is typically when antisocialists refer to the Lend–Lease Act, whose importance they exaggerate to comedic extremes. While the Lend–Lease Act was undoubtedly helpful to the Soviets, we really have no good reason to believe that it was decisive to the Allied war effort:

    From 1941 to 1945, total lend–lease aid to the Soviet Union accounted for only 5% of the Soviet GDP in total. And it is a salient point that over 80% of the aid was received after June 1942, when the tide of the war had already turned against the [anticommunists] on the Eastern Front. The Soviets had already won the critical battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk. [Fascism] was already losing the war when Lend–Lease to the Soviet Union had any significant effect, and that effect was minuscule compared with Soviet production at the time. By the time the first Sherman laid its tracks on Soviet soil, the writing was already very much on the wall for the Third Reich.

    Although Stalin, Khrushchev, and other Soviet politicians were very complimentary about the Lend–Lease program helping them win the war, the statistics tell a very different story. The noted historian David M. Glantz points out in this regard,

    “Lend–Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates…”

    He further states that without Lend–Lease, the Soviets still would have won, but the war would have taken 12 to 18 months longer.

    (Source.)